EU Data Protection Reform: Challenges for Cloud Computing by Marina Škrinjar Vidović
171CYELP 12 [2016] 171-206
EU DATA PROTECTION REFORM: CHALLENGES FOR 
CLOUD COMPUTING 
Marina Škrinjar Vidović*
Summary: The EC adopted a strategy to unleash the potential of cloud 
computing, where it marked data protection legislation as one of the 
main barriers for the development and expansion of cloud comput-
ing in Europe. In light of the EC goal to ensure a stimulating environ-
ment for the development of cloud computing in the EU, this paper 
aims to assess the consequences of the new roles and responsibilities 
of cloud service providers and the new rights for individuals under 
the GDPR. The analyses show that, in line with the position of data 
protection in the EU as a fundamental right, the GDPR considerably 
raises standards of data protection in cloud computing, which faces 
EU cloud service providers with a more demanding position than their 
non-EU competition. Further analysis shows that by promoting pri-
vacy enabling technology and by the extraterritorial application of the 
GDPR, together with the hefty fines for non-compliance, the GDPR pro-
vides tools that might force non-EU service providers to adjust their 
business model to EU standards, thus rebalancing possible market 
disruption in cloud computing. The paper concludes that the GDPR 
provides tools that might result in raised standards of data protection 
globally and in cloud computing in particular. 
1 Data protection reform in the context of cloud computing
The current EU Data Protection Directive1 (DPD, Directive) was 
adopted in 1995 and came into effect on 25 October 1998. Since then, 
the DPD has been the principal legal instrument in the data protection 
field in the European Union.
* Marina Škrinjar Vidović, LLM (Utrecht). The author wishes to thank the anonymous 
reviewers for their comments and guidance. 
1 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31. The Data Protection Directive was trans-
posed by the EU Member States and the three European Economic Area States: Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway by the Decision of the European Economic Area Joint Commit-
tee No 83/1999 Amending Protocol 37 and Annex XI (Telecommunications Services) to the 
EEA Agreement [2000] OJ L296/41. Switzerland has also implemented the Directive in 
the areas related to the Schengen Agreement: Annex B (Article 2(2)), Agreement between 
the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss 
Confederation’s Association with the implementation, application and development of the 
Schengen Acquis [2008] OJ L53/52.
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However, the data protection system has been among the most de-
bated issues in the EU in recent years, and there are many different 
reasons for this. One of the most important changes was made with the 
entry of the Treaty of Lisbon2 in December 2009, by which the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU3 became legally binding and data protec-
tion was elevated to the status of a separate fundamental right (article 
8). Consequently, this gave weight to the fundamental dimension of the 
DPD, which has been evident in the CJEU case law in recent years.4 
Further, the way in which data are collected, processed and accessed 
at present differs from the methods that were used around two decades 
ago. While the DPD provided a solid foundation for data protection, it 
was not equipped to handle the explosion in data collection and storage, 
and it did not specifically address the world of cloud computing,5 which 
fell into a regulatory grey area. Another deficiency of the DPD is that it 
failed to produce the desired level of harmonisation of national legisla-
tions within the EU.6 Rulings of the CJEU empowered national Data Pro-
tection Authorities (DPAs), which also had consequences for the different 
interpretation of the data protection rules.7 This EU-wide disparity has 
2 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community [2007] OJ C306/01.
3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391.
The Charter recognises the right to privacy in art 7 and the right to the protection of one’s 
personal data in art 8.
4 In this regard, see M Brkan, ‘The Unstoppable Expansion of EU Fundamental Right to 
Data Protection. Little Shop of Horrors?’ (2016) 23(5) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 812.
5 According to C Millard, Cloud Computing Law (OUP 2013) 3, ‘Cloud computing is a way 
of delivering computing resources as a utility service via a network, typically the Internet, 
scalable up and down according to user requirements’. According to Mell and Grance, the 
cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics (on demand self-service; broad 
network access; resource pooling; rapid elasticity; measured service), three service models 
(Software as a Service – SaaS; Platform as a Service – PaaS; and Infrastructure as a Service 
–IaaS), and four deployment models (Private cloud, Community cloud; Public cloud and Hy-
brid cloud). P Mell and T Grance, ‘The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing’ (2011) National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, US Department of Commerce (Special Publication 
800-145) <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.
pdf> accessed 16 May 2016. 
6 See Peter Hustinx, ‘EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and 
the Proposed General Data Protection Regulation’ 26-27 <https://secure.edps.europa.
eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/ Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speech-
es/2014/14-09-15_Article_EUI_EN.pdf> accessed 16 May 2016, and the Commission’s 
First Report on the Transposition of the Data Protection Directive <http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/document/transposition/index_en.htm> accessed 16 May 2016.
7 Eg, according to Case C‑230/14 Weltimmo EU:C:2015:639, a company might be subject 
to multiple data protection authorities; in Case C-362/14 Schrems EU:C:2015:650, na-
tional data protection authorities are empowered to decide on a case-by-case basis whether 
a particular data transfer meets all the relevant requirements prescribed under the national 
legislation and EU directive.
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in turn become a costly administrative burden for businesses.8 Finally, 
the Snowden revelations of mass unauthorised surveillance operations 
of several countries have raised concern about privacy protection among 
EU citizens, which has given impetus to the reform of the data protection 
framework. 
At the same time, in its digital agenda, the EC adopted the objective 
to unleash the potential of cloud computing. Estimations envisage that 
the cumulative economic impact of cloud computing in the EU could be 
up to EUR 940 billion and 3.8 million jobs for the period 2015–2020.9 
However, the EC has marked data protection legislation as one of the 
main barriers for the development and expansion of cloud computing in 
Europe.10 In particular, the Commission emphasised that 27 diverging 
national legislative frameworks disenable a cost-effective cloud solution 
at the level of a digital single market, and, in particular, that there is 
a need for clarification of regulations of international data transfers in 
cloud. Other concerns emphasised were the need for increased trans-
parency of data processing, and the need for the determination of the 
relevant location of a cloud provider. 
The data protection working party, the so-called Article 29 Working 
Party (WP29)11 adopted an Opinion on cloud computing on 1 July 2012.12 
In its Opinion, the WP29 outlined how the wide-scale deployment of cloud 
computing services can trigger a number of data protection risks, mainly 
a lack of control over personal data, as well as insufficient information 
with regard to how, where and by whom the data are being processed/
sub-processed. The Opinion gives a list of recommendations on how to 
apply the present EU Data Protection Directive, which, although not ob-
ligatory, the Commission has welcomed.13 
It seems that the development of cloud computing has shown all the 
shortcomings indicated by the DPD. The ability of data to move rapidly 
within the cloud and the lack of transparency about its physical location 
have presented problems for policy makers. While EU legislation is all 
8 See Commission, ‘Data Protection’ (2015) Special Eurobarometer 431/ Wave EB83.1 
– TNS opinion & social, Summary, 2 <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/
ebs_431_sum_en.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016.
9 Commission, ‘Unleashing the potential of Cloud Computing in Europe’ Communication 
COM(2012) 529 final, 8, quoting IDC (2012) ‘Quantitative Estimates of the Demand for 
Cloud Computing in Europe and the Likely Barriers to Take-up’ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0529:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 21 October 2016.
10 ibid.
11 The Article 29 Working Party is set is up under the Directive 95/46/EC. It is composed 
of representatives from all EU Data Protection Authorities, the EDPS and the European 
Commission. It has advisory status and acts independently.
12 WP 29 Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing, adopted on 1 July 2012.
13 Commission (n 9) 9.
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about keeping control over data and relies on the assumption that the 
controller has entire control of data processing, the use of cloud comput-
ing results in reducing the level of direct control. Additionally, most cloud 
computing contracts limit the liability of cloud processors to a level that 
is not equivalent to the potential risk for data subjects.
Following the challenges of the new technologies and the above-
mentioned shortcomings of data protection within the present Directive, 
in 2009 the European Commission announced it had started a procedure 
of data protection reform in the EU, and, finally, after years of intensive 
negotiations, in April 2016 the European Parliament adopted the long-
awaited General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, Regulation).14 The 
Regulation will replace the current Data Protection Directive and will be 
directly applicable in every EU Member State. Still, the DPD remains 
the main legal instrument regulating this area of law in the EU until 
the GDPR comes into force on 24 May 2018. The Regulation itself does 
not deal specifically with cloud computing, but sets out to be technology 
neutral. This means that the rules of the GDPR apply regardless of the 
means used to process personal data. Nevertheless, it will have specific 
consequences for cloud computing due to the nature of data processing 
that takes place in the cloud. 
The CJEU took an active role in shaping the GDPR during the tripar-
tite negotiations between the European Parliament, the European Com-
mission and the Council of Ministers, as the final text of the GDPR was 
highly influenced by its decisions adjudicated during the negotiations of 
the GDPR. In 2014, the Court issued a landmark ruling in the case Digi-
tal Rights Ireland15 by which it invalidated the 2006 Data Retention Direc-
tive, which required private providers to retain for a considerable period 
electronic communication metadata for law enforcement purposes. The 
CJEU held that the EU legislature had exceeded the limits of the principle 
of proportionality in relation to certain provisions of the EU Charter (arti-
cles 7, 8 and 52(1)), thus placing EU citizens’ privacy and data protection 
rights as a fundamental law on the centre stage. The Google Spain case16 
is of utmost importance, not only because the Court recognised the ‘right 
to be forgotten’ but even more because of its analysis of issues such as 
whether an internet search engine should be considered to be a data 
controller or a data processor; the territorial application of the EU data 
protection law; and the extension of data protection rights to the internet. 
14 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
15 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland EU:C:2014:238.
16 Case C-131/12 Google Spain and Google EU:C:2014:317.
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Finally, in Schrems,17 the Court invalidated the Safe Harbour adequacy 
decision for the transfer of data between the EU and US, stating that it 
does not offer a level of data protection equivalent to the level of protec-
tion in place in the EU. In particular, the Court found that the access 
enjoyed by the US intelligence services to the transferred data interferes 
with the right to respect for private life and the right to protection of per-
sonal data of EU citizens, thus enhancing the status of data protection 
as a fundamental right. Additionally, the decision enhanced the position 
of the DPAs as they gain the power to evaluate and counter EC adequacy 
decisions.
Making synergy between the rules of data protection as a human 
right and ensuring an environment for the development of the cloud mar-
ket in the EU is challenging in many aspects. Considering that the Com-
mission intends to promote the establishment and operation of cloud ser-
vice providers in the European Union, and on the other hand aims to 
reassure EU citizens that their data in the cloud are safe and under their 
control, the questions explored in this paper aim to determine whether the 
GDPR will make these compliance issues easier for the EU cloud service 
providers in order to ensure for them an enabling environment. There-
fore, the paper analyses new roles and responsibilities of cloud service 
providers under the GDPR. The impact of the new obligations will be ana-
lysed with regard to the scope of their implementation. This includes the 
provisions on encryption, extraterritoriality and trans-border data flow. 
Considering the topicality of cloud computing developments in the recent 
decade, reference is made in this paper to a number of scholars dealing 
with the most important insufficiencies of data protection rules in the 
complex cloud environment. The intention is not to analyse the technical 
aspects of cloud computing, although its most important aspects will be 
mentioned in order to analyse the final provisions of the GDPR and their 
impact. This paper does not attempt to provide any form of comprehen-
sive economic analysis of the GDPR on cloud computing. It has a more 
limited purpose to merely highlight the potential impacts of and to caution 
against the potentially burdensome measures of the GDPR.
The paper concludes that the GDPR significantly raises standards 
in line with the position of data protection as a fundamental right, thus 
putting EU cloud service providers in a more demanding position than 
their non-EU competition. However, possible marked disruption might 
be rebalanced by applying privacy enabling technology and through the 
extraterritorial application of the GDPR, which will force non-EU service 
providers to adjust their business model to EU standards. This might 
result in raising data protection standards on the global cloud market.
17 Schrems (n 7) 
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2 New responsibilities for cloud providers 
The GDPR imposes a number of new obligations for cloud providers 
in two different ways: by introducing contractual responsibilities of data 
processors as well as by introducing new measures with the aim of en-
forcing the rights of data subjects. Both will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs.
2.1 Changes in the data controller and data processor relationship
Under the European data protection law, a distinction between the 
data controller and data processor is crucial in order to properly allocate 
responsibility and liability, and to determine applicable law. In this re-
gard, the two main roles in cloud computing are cloud client and cloud 
service provider, where the cloud client will probably be considered as a 
data controller, and the cloud service provider as a data processor. How-
ever, in cloud computing sometimes it can be very difficult to establish 
whether the service provider is the data processor or the data controller. 
In reality, an individual (data controller) using a cloud computing service 
is unlikely to specifically determine the purpose and means18 of how the 
personal data he/she controls is processed. In cloud databases, data are 
stored among servers and other storage equipment across the cloud that 
will be reunited and delivered to a user logging in with the right creden-
tials.19 Information and personal data are rapidly transferred from one 
data centre to another and the customer has no control over the ‘means’ 
with which the data are processed. Additionally, there are many consum-
er-oriented cloud services where users are provided with free services, 
while the cloud providers use the collected personal data (eg for targeted 
advertising) to help pay for them; in this case, the cloud service providers 
would be data controllers. Given this, the role played by cloud computing 
providers should be determined on a case-by-case basis in view of the 
nature of the cloud services.20 
Under the current Data Protection Directive, cloud providers which 
act as data processors have few direct responsibilities,21 and these are 
18 DPD (n 1) art 2; GDPR (n 14) arts 4(7) and 28(10).
19 Millard (n 5) 9. 
20 P Hustinx, ‘Data Protection and Cloud Computing under EU Law’ (speech at the Third 
European Cyber Security Awareness Day, BSA, European Parliament, 13 April 2010) 3 
<www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/
Speeches/2010/10-04-13_Speech_Cloud_Computing_EN.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016.
21 Therefore, in Google Spain and Google (n 16) the CJEU found that the definition of 
‘data controller’ should be broadly construed, in order to provide ‘effective and complete 
protection of data subjects’. Given this, it decided that the operator of a search engine is to 
be considered a data controller rather than a data processor. The search engine operator 
determines the purposes and means of that activity and thus of the processing of personal 
data that it itself carries out within the framework of the activity and is thus a controller.
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mainly to ensure security of processing.22 In this regard, the WP29 in 
its Opinion on the concepts of controller and processor23 ‘recognises the 
difficulties in applying the definitions in a complex environment where 
many scenarios can be foreseen involving controllers and processors, 
alone or jointly, with different degrees of autonomy and responsibility’. 
It has emphasised that there is a need to ‘allocate responsibility between 
controller and processor in such a way that compliance with data pro-
tection rules will be sufficiently ensured in practice’. Therefore, with the 
aim of readjusting the definition of actors and roles, in some areas of 
the GDPR responsibilities are now placed on data processors directly, 
together with considerable fines for non-compliance, which will substan-
tially change the position of the data processor in the cloud environment. 
This means that service providers now run the risk of direct enforcement 
action by a supervisory authority in the event of non-compliance with 
their new obligations.
In this regard, under the GDPR, cloud service providers will be re-
quired to comply with a number of new specific obligations, including to 
maintain adequate documentation of all their data processing activities,24 
implement appropriate security standards,25 carry out routine data pro-
tection impact assessments,26 appoint a data protection officer,27 comply 
with the rules on international data transfers,28 and cooperate with the 
national DPA.29 
Presently, large cloud service providers (such as Google, Facebook, 
and Apple) which act as processors have standard, non-negotiable terms 
of service. Based on the popularity of these cloud providers, companies 
accept their take-it-or-leave-it contracts, and therefore are less in control 
of the data than they should be as controllers. This is why one of the key 
provisions affecting cloud computing services is article 28 GDPR, as it 
lists the obligatory contractual terms between processor and control-
ler. This contract will now define how the processor carries out data pro-
cessing on behalf of the controller, and presents a key tool for the transfer 
of responsibility between the controller and processor. In this regard, the 
contract between the controller and processor will now have to define the 
subject matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of 
22 Arts 16 and 17 DPD (n 1).
23 WP 29 Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of ‘controller’ and ‘processor’, adopted on 16 
February 2010.
24 GDPR (n14) art 30.
25 ibid, art 32.
26 ibid, art 35.
27 ibid, art 37.
28 ibid, art 44.
29 ibid, art 31.  
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the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects 
and the obligations and rights of the controller.30 However, more impor-
tant are additional specific contractual obligations for processors which 
include their obligation: to ensure that the processor’s staff are commit-
ted to confidentiality; to take adequate security measures to protect the 
data from loss, alteration or unauthorised processing; to engage a sub-
processor only with the prior permission of the controller; to agree with 
the controller the necessary technical and organisational requirements 
for the fulfilment of the data subjects’ rights in accordance with the Regu-
lation; to assist the controller in meeting his/her obligation to notify the 
supervisory authority and the data subjects of a data breach; to hand 
over all personal data after the end of the processing or the termination of 
the service agreement; and to make information available to the control-
ler and supervisory authority in certain circumstances. 
Still, the Regulation maintained the current system under the Di-
rective whereby controllers are responsible for the acts of processors. 
Moreover, the Regulation stipulates that where processing is to be car-
ried out on behalf of a controller, the controller shall use only processors 
providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet the 
requirements of the Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights 
of the data subject. This provision raises standards for cloud providers, 
and at the same time creates the obligation for the customer to test and 
examine the solution it is buying.31 
Processors are obligated to act only on the instructions of the con-
troller. If the processor makes its own decisions on personal data, rather 
than following the controller’s instructions, that processor is treated as 
a controller in respect of that processing activity and is subject to the 
full compliance obligations of a controller in relation to that processing.32 
Here it must be noted that this provision is not appropriate for applica-
tion to cloud service providers in IaaS. In this situation, it is generally the 
controller itself that processes data using the provider’s resources, rather 
than the provider actively processing data for the controller, so it makes 
little sense to refer to the controller instructing the processor in relation 
to the processing of data in IaaS.33 Considering that the GDPR tends to 
be technology neutral, it fails to correspond to the reality in which the 
technology works.
30 ibid, art 28 (3).
31 See Mark Weber, The GDPR’s Impact on the Cloud Service Provider as a Processor (2016) 
16(4) Privacy & Data Protecton.
32 GDPR (n 14) art 28 (10).
33 K Hon, J Hornle, C Millard, ‘Data Protection Jurisdiction and Cloud Computing: When 
Are Cloud Users and Providers Subject to EU Data Protection Law? The Cloud of Unknow-
ing, Part 3 (2012) 26(2-3) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 129, 152.
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Another new requirement was added to the GDPR in order to resolve 
responsibilities between different roles and to ensure implementation of 
the guaranteed rights of data subjects. This concerns the obligation of 
joint controllers to stipulate in an arrangement their respective respon-
sibilities, in particular their duties to allow individuals to exercise their 
rights to their personal data and to provide notice to individuals.34 Joint 
controllers are each liable for the entire damage caused by the process-
ing.35
In order to ensure effective implementation of the GDPR, all the fore-
going has led to the introduction of a new liability scheme through which 
processors may be jointly and severally liable with controllers. Both con-
trollers and processors will be subject to administrative fines under the 
GDPR, up to a maximum of EUR 20 million or 4% of the total worldwide 
turnover, whichever is higher.36 It is of huge significance that processors 
will now be directly liable to those whose data they process. Individu-
als will have powers to seek a judicial remedy and claim compensation 
against a processor for infringing their rights as a result of the proces-
sor’s non-compliance with the GDPR. Moreover, according to the rules of 
extraterritoriality of the Regulation, proceedings can be brought against a 
non-EU processor in the courts of the Member State where the individual 
resides. However, the processor is liable for the damage caused by its 
processing activities only where it has not complied with the obligations 
under the GDPR that are specifically directed to processors, or where it 
has acted outside or contrary to the lawful instructions of the controller. 
In this situation, the processor will be exempt from liability if it can dem-
onstrate that it is not responsible for the damage. 
Controllers and processers have until now defined their roles and ob-
ligations by contracts. However, the proposed new provisions will cause 
substantial changes in future contracting.37 For example, the GDPR fun-
damentally changes the relationship between processors on one side and 
controllers, individuals and the DPA on the other. Under the present Di-
rective, processors had no direct interaction with the DPA. However, now 
the DPA will have investigatory powers over processors and will be able to 
obtain access to all the personal data that the processor holds. It will have 
the right to access the processor’s premises, issue warnings, order compli-
ance, ban processing and ultimately issue fines. As previously noted, pro-
34 GDPR (n 14) art 26 (1). 
35 ibid,  art 26 (3) 
36 ibid, art 83
37 See also the analysis by V Hordern, ‘The EU General Data Protection Regulation: A Brave 
New World for Processors’ (2016) World Data Protection Report, 16 WDPR 02, available at 
<www.hldataprotection.com/files/2016/03/Hordern-Art-16WDPR02.pdf> accessed 10 De-
cember 2016.
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cessors (which employ more than 250 employees) are subject to the new 
obligation of maintaining records of processing activities in order to pro-
vide, upon request, the recorded information to the DPA. This is likely to 
require significant investment by processors in record-keeping functions. 
To demonstrate compliance with the requirement to implement ap-
propriate technical and organisational measures, processors may adhere 
to approved codes of conduct or industry standards drafted by asso-
ciations or bodies representing both controllers and processors.38 Such 
drafts must be submitted to the competent supervisory authority that 
will issue an opinion on the conformity of the draft to the Regulation, 
and, if favourable, will proceed to register it. These codes, once adopted 
as in compliance with the provisions of the Regulation, will certainly facil-
itate the drafting of future controller-processor contracts. In line with the 
activity envisaged in the EC Communication Unleashing the Potential of 
Cloud Computing in Europe, the EC established a Subgroup on the Code 
of Conduct for Cloud Service Providers within the Cloud Select Industry 
Group. The Code of Conduct was submitted to WP29 for its Opinion39 ac-
cording to which, at the time of writing this paper, the Code still does not 
meet the minimal legal requirements, and some substantial concerns re-
main (eg the definition of roles; the transparency of data processing; the 
applicability of the EU definition of personal data; reference to data port-
ability; the requirement for international transfers, etc). Following the 
received WP29 Opinion, the Code of Conduct for Cloud Service Providers 
is currently being finalised. Considering that the GDPR is technologically 
neutral, once adopted, the Code will certainly be useful for cloud service 
providers in helping them align with the new provisions of the Regula-
tion, but according to the specific environment of the cloud industry. 
Both the Directive and the GDPR exclude a number of activities that, 
while they constitute the processing of personal data, are outside the 
scope of the EU data protection law. One of the debated exemptions con-
nected with cloud computing is household exemption. Considering that 
there is a tendency for cloud providers to offer cloud computing services 
to individuals and end users, there was ambiguity about whether the 
cloud provider would be covered by the EU data protection framework, 
and hence whether individuals’ data would be properly protected. In this 
regard, the GDPR expressly states that this Regulation
does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural 
person in the course of a purely personal or household activ-
ity and thus with no connection to a professional or commer-
38 GDPR (n14) art 28 (5) in conjunction with art 40.
39 WP29 Opinion on C-SIG Code of Conduct on Cloud Computing, adopted on 22 Septem-
ber 2015.
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cial activity. Personal or household activities could include cor-
respondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking 
and online activity undertaken within the context of such activi-
ties. However, this Regulation applies to controllers or processors 
which provide the means for processing personal data for such 
personal or household activities.40 
With the insertion of the last sentence, the Regulation fills the gap 
in household exemption and enters an explicit requirement which binds 
cloud providers to the same requirement as regular data processors when 
providing a service to a natural person whose processing falls into the 
scope of household exemption. 
New obligations for processors under the GDPR have been criticised 
as inappropriate and burdensome when applied to a commoditised ser-
vice, such as cloud infrastructure services or as a platform as a service 
model (IaaS/PaaS).41 The problem is that considering the wide definition 
of personal data and the new roles of the processor, the cloud infra-
structure service falls under the remit of the GDPR, although processors 
merely provide resources to cloud users and do not have knowledge of the 
nature of the data stored and/or lack the practical ability to access such 
data. Their position and business model will be substantially changed in 
order to meet the requirements imposed by the GDPR. 
Another burden for cloud providers is the previously mentioned re-
quirement for prior specific or general written consent of the control-
ler to another (sub) processor.42 Cloud services are generally provided 
by using subcontractors in various constellations.43 However, because a 
typical cloud scenario may involve a larger number of subcontractors, 
the risk of processing personal data for further, incompatible purposes 
is quite high.44 Now, according to the GDPR, when engaged, subproces-
sors must ensure the same data protection obligations as the one set 
out in the contract between controller and processor; in particular, they 
must provide sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical 
and organisational measures in such a way that the processing meets 
the requirements of the GDPR. Where the subprocessor fails to fulfil its 
40 GDPR (n14), recital 18.
41 See Kuan Hon, ‘GDPR: Killing Cloud Quickly? (Privacy Perspectives, 17 March 2016) 
<https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-killing-cloud-quickly/> accessed 15 December 2016.
42 In line with WP 29 Opinion (n 12).
43 See in this regard, EU Expert Group on Cloud Computing Contracts’ ‘Discussion Paper 
on Subcontracting’, 25 March 2014 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/expert_
groups/expert_group_subcontracting_discussion_paper_en.pdf> accessed 15 December 
2016. 
44 WP 29 Opinion (n 12) 11.
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obligation, the initial processor remains fully liable to the controller for 
the subprocessor’s acts. As Hon emphasises,45 there is a higher probabil-
ity that only the big (US) players in the cloud industry that control their 
supply chain will be able to pass the GDPR obligations onto the subproc-
essors’ chain of liability, while small SaaS providers will have difficulties 
in negotiating with Amazon, Google or Microsoft to get them to accept 
these extra obligations. This, she predicted, will leave the larger players 
to dominate Europe’s cloud market.46 Unbalanced negotiating positions 
were also acknowledged by the WP29 which urged the Commission to 
provide for a more proactive role for consumer and business interest or-
ganisations in order to negotiate more balanced general terms and condi-
tions from big cloud computing providers.47 At the same time, the WP29 
states that ‘this imbalance in the contractual power of a small controller 
with respect to large service providers should not be considered as justi-
fication for the controllers to accept clauses and terms of contracts which 
are not in compliance with data protection law’.48 The Regulation does 
not have transitional arrangements with regard to the existing contracts, 
so all service providers who handle personal data, whether or not cloud 
based, will have to renegotiate contracts with data controllers to make 
sure liability is properly allocated according to the GDPR provisions.
2.2 Measures for enhancing the rights of individuals 
As stated by the legislators,49 the very aim of the Regulation is to put 
control of their data back into the hands of the data subjects. In line with 
this, the Regulation enhances existing and at the same time creates two 
new individual data protection rights: the rights to erasure and the right 
to data portability, which will have a direct effect on cloud providers and 
thus are analysed in more detailed below. 
The right to erasure builds on and expands the so-called ‘right to 
be forgotten’ recognised by the CJEU.50 According to the adopted pro-
45 See Kuan Hon’s series of publications on the GDPR influence on cloud computing 
<www.kuan0.com/publications.html> accessed 15 December 2016. See particularly Grae-
me Burton, ‘Costs and Administrative Burdens of GDPR Will Help US Companies Domi-
nate the EU’s Cloud Computing Market’ (V3, 27 October 2016) <www.v3.co.uk/ v3-uk/
news/2475499/costs-and-administrative-burdens-of-gdpr-will-help-us-companies-domi-
nate-the-eus-cloud-computing-market> accessed 15 December 2016. 
46 However, see the contrary opinion of P Bindley cited in N Ismail ‘Capability and Not the 
Size of Cloud Service Providers Will Determine Which of Them Thrive Under the GDPR’ 
(Information Age, 14 November 2016) available at <www.information-age.com/size-matter-
cloud-post-gdpr-123463175/> accessed 20 December 2016.
47 WP29 Opinion (n 12) 23. 
48 ibid 14.
49 See Commission, ‘Protection of Personal Data’ (European Commission: Justice) <http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/> accessed 15 December 2016. 
50 Google Spain Google (n 16).
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vision of the Regulation, controllers must erase personal data without 
undue delay if: the data are no longer necessary in relation to the pur-
pose for which they were collected; the data subject withdraws consent or 
there is no other legal ground for processing; the data subject objects to 
the processing; personal data have been unlawfully processed; personal 
data have to be erased in accordance with national law; personal data 
have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services 
directly to a child. Following criticism51 that the right to erasure conflicts 
with other fundamental rights, the final text of the GDPR stipulates that 
the right to erasure has to be balanced against the freedom of expression 
and the right to information, compliance with a Union or Member State 
legal obligation, the performance of a task of public interest or the exer-
cise of official authority, public interest in health, scientific and historical 
research, and the exercise or defence of legal claims. 
The GDPR reinforces the right to erasure by clarifying that organisa-
tions in the online environment which make personal data public should 
take ‘reasonable steps’ to inform other organisations that process the 
personal data to erase links to, copies or replication of the personal data 
in question.52 The Regulation does not define ‘reasonable steps’, as these 
will depend on available technology and the cost of implementation, but 
taking into consideration the possibility of a massive transfer of data 
in the cloud environment, and that the location of specific data may be 
difficult to determine in the cloud due to fragmentation, as well as the 
open question about who the original controller is and how the original 
controller will be able to identify other controllers it needs to notify in the 
complex cloud environment, it can be presumed that the right to erasure 
will present a substantial burden for cloud providers.53 
However, the main deficiency of this provision is that data control-
lers will now be tasked with the role of judge and jury when consider-
ing requests for the erasure of data.54 There is a high possibility that 
data controllers will not risk high administrative fines (again up to EUR 
20,000,000 or 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is 
51 See V Reading, ‘The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Set-
ter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age’ (speech held at the DLD Conference 
in Munich, 22 January 2012)  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-26_
hr.htm> accessed 1 December 2016.
52 GDPR (n 14) art 17(2) in conjunction with recital 66.
53 In that regard, see ENISA, ‘The Right to Be Forgotten – Between Expectations and Prac-
tice’ (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, 20 November 2012) 
<www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/the-right-to-be-forgotten> accessed 20 September 
2016.
54 In this regard, see eg G Francoise, ‘The Right of Erasure or Right to be Forgotten: What 
the Recent Laws, Cases, and Guidelines Mean for Global Companies (2015) 18(8) Journal of 
Internet Law 1, 8; ML Rustad and S Kulevska, ‘Reconceptualising the Right to be Forgotten 
to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow’ (2015) 28(2) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology.
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higher) and that they will generally erase data following the data subject’s 
request, which could subsequently have an impact on achieving a bal-
ance with freedom of speech and the right to information regardless of 
the imposed safety provisions. Considering that the right to erasure pre-
sumes conducting a balancing test between different fundamental rights 
which was until now done by the CJEU itself, it is unrealistic to expect 
cloud service providers to be qualified for this exercise. Therefore, very 
precise instructions on the application of the right to erasure should be 
provided, preferably by the WP29,55 and the role of national DPAs should 
be enhanced as an advisory body in regard to the enquiries on the ap-
plication of right to erasure. 
Another new burdensome measure is the right to data portability56 
which was adopted with the aim of solving vendor lock-in problems. The 
right to data portability requires data controllers to ensure that they can 
hand over the personal data they possess about the data subject in a us-
able and transferable format, when the data is provided and processed 
on the basis of consent or contract. Currently, most cloud providers do 
not make use of standard data formats and service interfaces facilitating 
interoperability and portability between different cloud providers.57 For 
small and medium sized enterprises, this new right to transfer personal 
data between controllers creates a disproportionate and significant addi-
tional burden, requiring substantial investment in new systems and pro-
cesses to ensure export and import mechanisms for the transfer of data.58 
According to the EU Expert Group on Cloud Computing Contracts,59 
the migration of data should be considered as a chargeable extra service 
to be offered by cloud providers. However, this might create the risk of ‘big’ 
cloud providers increasing the transaction costs necessary to shift from 
one service to another, and in this way locking their users into their sys-
tems. This could be considered an abusive practice insofar as the cloud 
providers hold a dominant position in the market.60. Therefore, there is a 
policy recommendation that the rule of data portability should be com-
55 In this regard, WP29 already adopted on 26 November 2014 the Guidelines on the im-
plementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union judgment in Case C-131/12 
Google Spain SL and Google Inc v Agencia Española De Protección De Datos (Aepd) and Mario 
Costeja González. 
56 GDPR (n 14) art 20.
57 WP29 Opinion (n 39) 12.
58 See P Swire and Y Lagos, ‘Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer 
Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique’ (2013) 72(2) Maryland Law Review 335.
59 EC Expert Group on Cloud Computing Contracts, Synthesis of the Meeting of 11/12 De-
cember 2014 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/7th_expert_group_synthesis_fi-
nal.pdf> accessed 1 December 2016.
60 P De Filippi and L Belli, ‘Law of the Cloud v Law of the Land: Challenges and Opportuni-
ties for Innovation’ (2012) 3(2) European Journal for Law and Technology 6. 
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plemented with the EU competition rules and policy.61 In its Guidelines 
on the right to data portability issued on 13 December 2016, the WP29 
emphasis that article 12 GDPR prohibits the data controller from charg-
ing a fee for the provision of personal data, unless the data controller can 
demonstrate that the requests are manifestly unfounded or excessive, ‘in 
particular because of their repetitive character’. 62 Further, it states that, 
in fact, article 12 GDPR focuses on the requests made by one data sub-
ject and not on the total number of requests received by a data control-
ler, and that, as a result, the overall system implementation costs should 
neither be charged to the data subjects nor be used to justify a refusal 
to answer portability requests. However, it remains to be seen how the 
cloud market will apply this recommendation. 
2.3 Concluding remarks
Following the inclusion of the new measures for enhancing the right 
of individuals and for the new responsibilities of data processors un-
der the GDPR, cloud service providers will have to substantially change 
the way they operate. Investment will be needed in policies, procedures, 
technologies, training and staff to ensure full compliance with the GDPR. 
For example, according to the ICO study on the expected costs for GDPR 
compliance,63 the UK Ministry of Justice produced research of its own 
that concludes the cost to UK business could be as high as £320 million 
a year, and £2.1 billion over fourteen years.64 All this can have a substan-
tial influence on prices and might disrupt the market of cloud computing. 
In this regard, the EC might use the possibility to co-finance investments 
and provide free training through EU funds and programmes for support-
ing small service providers in meeting their new legal obligations.65 Ad-
61 Eg B Engels,  ‘Data Portability Among Online Platforms’ (2016) 5(2) Internet Policy Review 
<https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/data-portability-among-online-platforms> ac-
cessed 20 September 2016. 
62 WP29 Guidelines on the right to data portability, adopted on 13 December 2016, 12.
63 See London Economics, ‘Implications of the European Commission’s Proposal for a Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation for Business’  (Final Report to the Information Commis-
sioner’s Office, May 2013)  <https://ico.org.uk/media/1042341/implications-european-
commissions-proposal-general-data-protection-regulation-for-business.pdf> accessed 20 
December 2016. 
64 One responder to the survey predicted that GDPR would cost their company £5 million 
to become compliant, and £1 million a year to maintain it!
65 The EU already promotes and supports the research and development of privacy en-
hancing technologies, privacy by design and privacy by default settings through research 
priorities in FP 7. In this regard, see Commission Staff Working Paper – Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the document Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) and the Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, inves-
tigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
and the free movement of such data, SEC(2012) 72 final, 95.
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ditionally, the EC should provide additional measures in order to ensure 
more balanced general terms and conditions with regard to big cloud 
computing providers, as the GDPR fails to deal with this problem. De-
tailed instructions on the implementation of the right to erasure should 
be prepared, preferably by the WP29, and DPAs should be enhanced as 
an advisory body in this regard.  
However, even in the case of a breach of GDPR obligations, big cloud 
players will be in a better position to ‘afford’ the fines, which is not true 
for start-ups and small service providers. Although the GDPR stipulates 
that there is joint liability between controllers and processors, it will be 
the customer’s choice as to who they want the fines paid by, and it is 
then up to the data processor to be refunded from the responsible parties 
within the supply chain.66 Therefore, a processor could be sued, perhaps 
because it is seen as bigger, even if the damage was caused by the con-
troller.67 If contracts between processors and controllers are not negoti-
ated properly and are not detailed enough, the question of compensation 
might end up in court proceedings68 during which the processor might 
lose its market position and its service might no longer be compatible 
with the other services on the market. In order to avoid this situation, 
small cloud processors should be empowered in negotiating contracts, as 
proposed by the WP29. A useful tool could be the Code of Conduct that 
is being finalised and which will reconcile the Regulation requirements 
to the specific environment of the cloud industry, and which should have 
more detailed provisions on determining responsibilities and the division 
of liability.
The new responsibilities of data processors and the rights of data 
subjects reflect the intention of the legislator to ensure the highest level 
of protection of personal data of EU citizens as a fundamental right. Ob-
viously and justifiably, the scale is tipping towards ensuring the privacy 
and security of EU citizens on account of the enabling environment for 
cloud computing in the EU. This might result in market disruption in 
favour of the dominant non-EU cloud service providers. However, the 
real impact of the GDPR must be determined with regard to its scope of 
application. This includes rules on anonymisation, territorial application 
and trans-border data flows that are analysed further in the text.
66 Bindley (n 46).
67 Kuan Hon, ‘Open Season on Service Providers? The General Data Protection Regu-
lation Cometh…’ (SCL – The IT Law Community, 4 August 2015) <www.scl.org/site.
aspx?i=ed43376> accessed 1 December 2016
68 GDPR (n 14) art 82 (6).
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3 Anonymisation and the re-indentification risk in the cloud envi-
ronment 
The Regulation defines personal data as any information relating to 
an identified or identifiable natural person, ie data subject.69 Further, it 
states that an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier. The Regu-
lation lists the identifiers;70 however, the list is not exhaustive (it states 
‘such as’). The definition of personal data adopted in the GDPR leans 
heavily on one adopted in the DPD and it reflects the intention of the 
European lawmaker to embrace a wide notion of personal data that was 
also confirmed by WP2971 and CJEU case law.72 Even more, the Regula-
tion broadens the list of identifiers to include online identifiers,73 such as 
internet protocol addresses,74 cookie identifiers or other identifiers such 
as radio frequency identification tags, as they ‘may leave traces which, in 
particular when combined with unique identifiers and other information 
received by the servers, may be used to create profiles of the natural per-
sons and identify them’. Accordingly, the wider the definition of personal 
69 ibid, art 4 (1).
70 GDPR (n 14) art 4(1): Identifiers are: name, an identification number, location data, an 
online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, psychological, genetic, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person 
71 WP 29 Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, adopted on 20 June 2007.
72 Eg  Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist ECLI:EU:C:2003:596: The name of a person in con-
junction with his/her telephone number, and information about his/her working condi-
tions or hobbies constitute personal data; Case C-212/13 Rynes ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428: 
The image of a person recorded by a camera constitutes personal data because it makes it 
possible to identify the person concerned; Case C-201/14 Bara ECLI:EU:C:2015:638: Tax 
data transferred are personal data, since they are information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person; Case T-259/03 Nikolaou ECLI:EU:T:2007:254: The information 
published in the press release was personal data, since the data subject was easily identifi-
able, under the circumstances. The fact that the applicant was not named did not protect 
her anonymity; Case C-582/14 Breyer v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2016:779: the ECJ stated 
that dynamic IP addresses held by a website operator constitute personal data as long as 
the operator has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional 
data which the [ISP] has about that person.
73 GDPR (n14) recital 30.
74 In line with the Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended ECLI:EU:C:2011:771 and Breyer (n 72); 
as well as with WP29 Opinion 4/2007 (n 71) 16. Presently MSs have different views as to 
whether IP addresses constitute personal data that are subject to data protection laws. For 
example, courts in Sweden (Antipyratbyran), Spain (Promusicae) and Austria have all found 
that IP addresses are personal data in the context of such cases, taking a broad view of per-
sonal data as does the Article 29 Working Party.  But in its decisions, courts in France (the 
Limewire, Anthony G and Henri S decisions) and Italy (the Peppermint case) have both found 
IP addresses not to be personal data. See detailed analyses: time.lex, ‘Study of Case Law on 
the Circumstances in Which IP Addresses Are Considered Personal Data (Final Report, 2 
May 2011) 209 
<http://www.timelex.eu/frontend/files/userfiles/files/publications/2011/IP_addresses_
report_-_Final.pdf>  accessed 15 December 2016.
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data, the greater is the chance that the services of the cloud providers will 
fall under the remit of the Regulation. The second precondition for the 
application of the GDPR is that personal data are being processed. While 
the definition of processing is in line with that adopted in the DPD,75 it 
would probably include most of the operations that are likely to occur in 
the cloud, including simply the storage of data (IaaS). 
However, the nature of cloud services conflicts with the EU data pro-
tection requirements. It is said that cloud services are natively ‘data in-
different’ or ‘data blind’.76 In particular, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
has not been designed around the processing of personal data. In these 
cases, the cloud service provider acting as a data processor typically does 
not identify the personal data on their service, in particular when they are 
not entitled under the service agreement to identify such personal data, 
or when the customer has deployed tools such as data encryption which 
prevent the cloud service providers from identifying the personal data on 
their service.77 In fact, customers can encrypt their personal data before 
uploading to the cloud in a way that the cloud provider has no access to 
the decryption key, so that no privacy risks can arise.78 Therefore, in the 
context of the data protection framework in the cloud computing environ-
ment, the important question is whether the processor, who is holding 
encrypted data without holding the keys and as such is not aware of the 
contents and nature of these data, is required to comply with extensive 
data protection requirements. In this respect, the main question for the 
cloud service provider is whether anonymised, pseudonymised and en-
crypted data before submission to the cloud provider by the cloud cus-
tomer fall under the remit of the definition of personal data.
Presently, according to recital 26 of the Data Protection Directive, the 
principles of data protection do not apply to data rendered anonymous. 
However, the interpretation and application of anonymous data are not 
straightforward, especially when considering how to anonymise person-
al data sufficiently to take data outside the Data Protection Directive.79 
The Article 29 Working Party (WP29), in its Opinion on anonymisation 
techniques,80 made a rigid interpretation of personal data that have been 
pseudonymised, strongly encrypted or anonymised, expressing doubts 
75 GDPR (n14) art 4 (2).
76 This is true for the IaaS and PaaS service. See M Maggiore, ‘Cloud Computing: Obliga-
tions under the Directive v GDPR’ (June 2016) Data Protection Law & Policy. However in 
many consumer-oriented cloud services, users are provided with free services while cloud 
providers use collected personal data (eg for targeted advertising) to help pay for them.
77 See WP29 Opinion (n 39) 7. 
78 See Kuan Hon, ‘Dark Clouds?’ (2016) 43(4) Intermedia Journal of the International In-
stitute of Communications.
79 Millard (n 5) 168.
80 WP29 Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques, adopted on 10 April 2014.
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on those techniques and suggesting a cautious approach. Moreover, in 
the same Opinion, the WP29 analysed the real risks of (re)identification 
in very abstract terms, stating that technology is changing and the risk 
of re-identification cannot be completely eliminated on account of future 
technological developments, particularly if there is the possibility of com-
bining different data sets.
It is undisputable that advances in technology, by the recombina-
tion of separate databases and by building connections between items 
of data and thereby identifying the person to whom they relate, have 
helped the de-anonymisation or re-identification of individuals hiding 
in anonymised data.81 However, scholars argue that following the WP29 
Opinion on anonymisation, easy re-identification makes the EU data pro-
tection legislation too broad and hinders the development of IT services 
in general. It is said that ‘a law that was meant to have limits is rendered 
limitless, disrupting the careful legislative balance between privacy and 
information flow and extending datahandling requirements to all data in 
all situations’.82 
In practice, not all DPAs accepted the WP29’s strict position on an-
onymisation. For example, the UK’s DPA, the Information Commission-
er’s Office (ICO), in its code of practice on anonymisation states: ‘The DPA 
does not require anonymisation to be completely risk free – you must 
be able to mitigate the risk of identification until it is remote ... 100% 
anonymisation is the most desirable position, and in some cases this is 
possible, but it is not the test the DPA requires’.83 Therefore, the ICO, 
along with the Swedish DPA,84 accepted a risk-based approach aimed at 
assessing the risk of identification and related harm to the data subject.85 
Accordingly, a service provider’s obligation is to take reasonable care to 
preserve confidentiality, taking account of the state of the technology at 
the time. However, a wise provider will need to keep alert to new devel-
opments in re-identification, as a failure to adapt to new technologies 
81 Many scholars have analysed the re-indentification problem. Eg, see P Ohm, ‘Broken 
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymisation’ (2009) 57 
UCLA Law Review 1701. IS Rubenstein and W Hartzog, ‘Anonymization and Risk’ (2016) 91 
Washington Law Review 703; D Nunan, M Di Domenica, ‘Exploring Reindentification Risk: 
Is Anonymization a Promise We Can Keep?’ (2015) 58(1) International Journal of Market 
Research 19. 
82 Ohm (n 81) 1741.
83 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection 
Risk. Code of Practice (ICO 2012) <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/docu-
ments/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016.
84 See Swedish Data Protection Authority, ‘Cloud Services and the Personal Data Act’ 
<http://www.datainspektionen.se/in-english/cloud-services/> accessed 20 September 
2016.
85 See also the test for assessing the risk of identification proposed by Ohm (n 81).
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can also amount to a failure to take reasonable care.86 Accordingly, the 
intended storage period of information is also relevant, as, for example, 
anonymised data meant to be stored for a month might not be consid-
ered personal data, and there is less chance for re-indentification in one 
month than in a period of several years.87
The adopted text of the Regulation, in line with the DPD, similarly 
states that using data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data 
subject is no longer identifiable does not fall under the scope of the ap-
plication of the EU regulatory framework on data protection.88 This is 
in line with the status of anonymisation in the data protection frame-
work, where it has become, in legal and regulatory terms, a marker of the 
boundary between public and personal data and thus a key part of data 
protection legislation.
Additionally, and in line with the technical developments in re-iden-
tification techniques, the Regulation introduces the new legal concept of 
pseudonymisation. The GDPR defines pseudonymisation as the process-
ing of personal data in such a way that the data can no longer be attrib-
uted to a specific data subject without the use of additional information. 
To pseudonymise a data set, the identifier must be kept separately and 
subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure non-attribu-
tion to an identified or identifiable person. Like encryption, pseudonymi-
sation is considered a security protection measure89 and it is also explic-
itly mentioned as a ‘data by protection by design and by default’ or PbD 
technique.90 The GDPR has incentives for controllers to pseudonymise 
the data that they collect. For example, in the event of a data breach af-
fecting pseudonymised data, data subjects may not need to be informed 
if the key to allow re-identification was not compromised.91 Additionally, 
controllers that pseudonymise their data sets will have an easier time us-
ing personal data for secondary purposes and for scientific and historical 
research,92 as well as meeting the Regulation’s data security and data by 
design requirements.93
Still, according to the GDPR, although pseudonymisation reduces 
the risks of processing, it is not intended by the Regulation to preclude 
86 C Reed, ‘Information “Ownership” in the Cloud’ (2010) Queen Mary University of London, 
School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No 45/2010, 20.
87 K Hon, C Millard and I Walden, ‘The Problem of “Personal Data” in Cloud Computing’ 
(2011) 1(4) International Data Privacy Law.
88 GDPR (n 14) recital 26.
89 ibid, art 32.
90 ibid, art 25.
91 ibid, recital 29.
92 ibid, recital 156.
93 ibid, recital 78.
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any other measures of data protection.94 Still, much debate surrounds 
the extent to which anonymised and pseudonymised data can be re-iden-
tified. This issue is of critical importance because it determines whether 
a processing operation will be subject to the provisions of the Regulation, 
especially considering newly imposed obligations on processors that will 
have a strong impact on cloud service providers. The GDPR emphasis 
that the data controller should have in place appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to mitigate the risk of de-identification.95 Fur-
ther, distinguishing between pseudonymous data, which fall under the 
scope of the GDPR, and anonymous data, which do not, the GDPR ac-
knowledges the DPD provision that in risk assessment account should 
be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling 
out, either by the controller or by another person, to identify the natural 
person directly or indirectly.96 In assessing what means are reasonably 
likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken 
of all objective factors such as the costs of and the amount of time re-
quired for identification, taking into consideration the available technol-
ogy at the time of the processing and also technological developments. It 
seems that by acknowledging the objective standard of ‘reasonable effort’ 
as opposed to the currently very extensive WP29 approach to the risk of 
re-identification, there is good basis for the GDPR to provide greater flex-
ibility concerning the applicability of anonymised and pseudonymised 
data.97 For example, where the controller deletes the identification key, 
and where the remaining indirect identifiers pose little risk of identifying 
an individual, the controller may be able to argue that there is no rea-
sonable risk of re-identification and that it does not fall under the GDPR 
obligations.
In this respect, the recent judgment of the CJEU in Breyer98 is par-
ticularly significant. Although the CJEU did not expressly deal with the 
re-identification issues, in its decision the court recognises that there are 
two opposing views, ie ‘objective’ or ‘relative’ criteria, on whether someone 
is identifiable.99 The Court ruled that dynamic IP addresses can consti-
tute personal data when the data controller, according to national law, 
has the legal means to ask additional information from a third party in 
order to truly identify a person. One can conclude that if there are no 
available legal means under the respective local laws for the respective 
94 ibid, recital 28.
95 ibid, recital 75.
96 ibid, recital 26.
97 See G Maldoff, ‘Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 8 – Pseudonymization 
(The Privacy Advisor, 12 February 2016) <https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-
impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-8-pseudonymization/> accessed 15 September 2016.
98 Breyer (n 72).
99 ibid, para 25.
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party to identify an individual, the dynamic IP address may not consti-
tute personal data. Therefore, although the CJEU does not directly con-
sider the issue of the likelihood of identification, one can conclude from 
its ruling that it adopted the objective standard of ‘reasonable effort’ as 
defined by the GDPR.100
As scientific and research developments have made it more diffi-
cult to truly anonymise personal data and to guarantee anonymisation, 
and have made it easier to re-identify data subjects from anonymous 
data, more and more data may fall within the pseudonymous rather than 
anonymous category.101 On the other hand, if the techniques that un-
derlie the principles of anonymisation are shown to be broken, there are 
serious implications for those who rely on it to maintain trust.102 While 
the concept of data protection through technology is a key component 
of modern data protection law, without mandatory requirements and le-
gal incentives, there is the risk that developers and controllers will not 
provide privacy enhancing technologies to their respective customers.103 
This is in line with the finding of an analysis of the terms of services of 
cloud providers,104 which found that the majority of the companies at is-
sue do not mention encryption policies in their terms of services. While 
it is clear that using privacy enhancing technologies is an additional cost 
to companies, the accepted legal solution, ie the inclusion of incentives 
for pseudonymisation, as well as acknowledging the objective standard of 
‘reasonable effort’ for re-identification, might encourage cloud providers 
to use anonymisation and pseudonymisation when processing personal 
data, and thus in fact raise the security of data subjects, especially tak-
ing into consideration the amount of data stored in the cloud service. In 
fact, by imposing objective criteria for de-identification, it could be con-
cluded that the Regulation in essence provides the right balance between 
data protection as a fundamental right and ensuring an environment for 
the development of the cloud market in the EU. However, this again will 
depend on its implementation. 
100 See also the analysis of G Spindler and P Schmechel, Personal Data and Encryption 
in the European General Data Protection Regulation’ (2016) 7(2) Journal of Intellectual 
Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law <www.jipitec.eu/issues/jip-
itec-7-2-2016/4440> accessed 15 September 2016.
101 Kuan Hon and others, ‘Cloud Accountability: The Likely Impact of the Proposed EU Data 
Protection Regulation’ (2014) Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No 
07/2014, 10. 
102 Nunan and Domenico (n 81) 22.
103 G Hornung, Regulating Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Seizing the Opportunity of the 
Future European Data Protection Framework’ (2013) 26(1-2) European Journal of Social 
Science Research 181, 181.
104 K Stylianou, J Venturini, N Zingales, ‘Protecting User Privacy in the Cloud: An Analysis 
of Terms of Service’ (2015) 6(3) European Journal of Law and Technology 16.
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The WP29, in its Opinion 02/2015 on the C-SIG Code of Conduct on 
Cloud Computing, adopted on 22 September 2015, required the inclu-
sion of its high standards of anonymisation as defined in the above cited 
Opinion on anonymisation techniques in the final text of the Code. It will 
be interesting to see whether this requirement will be changed following 
the provisions adopted in the GDPR and recent case law. 
4 The extraterritorial application of the GDPR 
When considering the scope of application of the GDPR, we are talk-
ing about jurisdiction. The doctrine distinguishes three main types of 
jurisdiction: prescriptive (or legislative), judicial (or adjudicative) and 
enforcement jurisdiction. The terminology itself gives insights into their 
scope: prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction relates to the power to 
make law in relation to a specific subject matter; judicial (or adjudicative) 
jurisdiction deals with the power to adjudicate a particular matter; and 
enforcement jurisdiction relates to the power to enforce existing law (for 
example, arresting, prosecuting and/or punishing an individual under 
that law). All these forms of jurisdiction may be exercised in an extra-
territorial manner.105 The doctrine distinguishes the application of the 
extraterritoriality principle106 in public international law and in the EU 
data protection framework. Accordingly, the concept of extraterritorial-
ity in public international law aims to protect an individual who is not 
physically present in the territory that is party to a particular human 
rights treaty, and hence in principle it applies only in a vertical relation-
ship. On the other hand, the EU data protection framework mainly seeks 
to protect the data subject residing in the EU territory but experiencing 
data protection violations from a controller established in a third county. 
The extraterritorial principle of the EU data protection framework is ap-
plicable in both vertical and horizontal situations, and protects data from 
both public and private controllers.107
However, not all jurisdictional claims are equally likely to be carried 
out in practice. Jurisdictions with no prospects of being exercised in re-
ality are in doctrine described as regulatory overreaching. While a num-
ber of authors see regulatory overreach as a problem per se,108 there are 
105 On the differentiation of extraterritoriality and territorial extension, see J Scot, ‘Extrater-
ritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law (2014) 62 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 87; and J Scott, ‘The New EU “Extraterritoriality”’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 1343.
106 On the concept of extraterritoriality, see C Kuner, ‘Extraterritoriality and Regulation of 
International Data Transfers in EU Data Protection Law (2015) 5(4) International Data Pri-
vacy Law 238.
107 Brkan (n 4) 828-829.
108 See C Kuner and others, ‘The Extraterritoriality of Data Privacy Laws – An Explosive Is-
sue Yet to Detonate’ (2013) 3(3) International Data Privacy Law.
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also opposite positions stating that even if jurisdiction is not enforceable, 
there is a positive impact of its enactment in the form of fear of a sanction 
in the case of non-compliance.109 In cloud computing, it is difficult to de-
termine at any given time the location of personal data and of the equip-
ment being used, and therefore there is a need for clear guidelines on the 
applicable law in order to address new technological developments.110 
This is why the debate on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction is es-
pecially relevant when discussing the extraterritorial principle of the EU 
data protection framework and its application in cloud computing, more 
importantly taking into consideration the new responsibilities and meas-
ures imposed by the GDPR on cloud service providers. 
4.1 Scope of the GDPR and its impact on cloud computing 
The Regulation states that even the establishment of a controller or 
a processor in Member State territory will trigger applicability regard-
less of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not,111 even if 
it processes personal data of only non-EU residents. This concept is in 
doctrine defined as the country of origin approach.112 The Regulation 
defines territorial scope by reference to the processing of personal data 
in the context of the activities of an establishment in the Union. The pro-
vision ‘context of activities’ might lead to extensive judicial jurisdiction, 
and its implementation will depend on the national courts’ interpretation 
that can lead to a different implementation of the Regulation contrary to 
the intentions of the legislator. Additionally, in order to eliminate pre-
sent MS national law conflicts, the Regulation included the main estab-
lishment concept.113 However, the provision of the main establishment 
concept is not straightforward in the context of cloud computing. For 
example, cloud providers might have a number of data centres located 
within different MSs where no main decision or main processing is made, 
with headquarters outside the EU, and the Regulation does not give guid-
ance on which data centre would be the main establishment in this situ-
ation.114 However, as long as a data controller (cloud client) or data pro-
cessor (cloud provider) is located within the EU, all processing conducted 
by the said controller or processor would be subject to the GDPR, even if 
these activities are not actually conducted within EU territory or related 
109 See DJB Svantesson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Law: Its Theoretical 
Justification and its Practical Effect on US Businesses’ (2014) (50)(1) SJIL 60.
110 See WP29 Opinion 8/2010 on Applicable Law, adopted on 16 December 2010. 
111 GDPR (n 14) art 3(1).
112 See K Hon, J Hornle and C Millard, ‘Data Protection Jurisdiction and Cloud Computing: 
When Are Cloud Users and Providers Subject to EU Data Protection Law? The Cloud of Un-
knowing, Part 3’ (2012) 26(2-3) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 129.
113 GDPR (n 14) ref 36, art 4(16).
114 See Hon, Hornle and Millard (n 112) 136. 
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to EU data subjects. Criticism has been made that, considering the strict 
provisions of the GDPR, this requirement may have the effect of deterring 
non-EU cloud providers from setting up or retaining any establishments 
in the EU, which may be said to be places of administration, such as EU 
offices, or from building or using EU data centres or EU sub-providers.115 
Secondly, as regards prescriptive jurisdiction, the GDPR applies ex-
traterritorially to any entity (data processor or a data controller) that of-
fers goods or services to residents (data subjects) of the EU. This concept 
is in doctrine defined as the targeting approach. Therefore, if the service 
provider is established outside the EU but offers services within the EU, 
the Regulation will also apply following the location of people in the EU 
whose data is being processed. The Regulation also clarifies that offering 
goods or services to data subjects in the Union irrespective of whether 
payment is required, or monitoring the behaviour of data subjects as far 
as their behaviour takes place within the Union, will trigger applicabili-
ty.116 This provision has direct effect on cloud computing, as there are 
many consumer-oriented cloud services where users are provided with 
free services while cloud providers use collected personal data (eg, for 
targeted advertising) to help pay for them.117 
Recital 23 of the Regulation lays out the criteria for determining 
whether a data controller is offering goods or services to data subjects 
in the EU. Basically, if it is apparent that the data controller is envisag-
ing the offering of services to data subjects residing in one or more EU 
Member States, the legislation would apply. Thus, a website or applica-
tion would become subject to the law only to the extent that it actively 
markets to the particular geographic area, but not if it merely provides 
a site or application that is available to individuals in a particular geo-
graphic area.118 Additionally, if a company operates a service in the MS 
language119 or currency of a MS country, or if it mentions customers 
of the MS, it could trigger the applicability of the GDPR. To determine 
whether individuals’ behaviour is being monitored, it should be assessed 
whether individuals are tracked on the internet, including subsequent 
profiling, in particular for analysing or predicting their personal prefer-
115 ibid 151.
116 GDPR (n 14) art 3(2). 
117 See EC Expert Group on Cloud Computing Contracts, Synthesis of the Meeting of 30 
April 2014, Overview of Current Terms Relating to the Use of Content, 1 <http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/contract/files/final_synthesis_30_april_6th_meeting_en.pdf> accessed 10 De-
cember 2016.
118 GDPR (n 14)  recital 23; in line with the CJEU ruling in Lindqvist (n 72), where the CJEU 
suggested a territorial limitation to the EU rules for international data transfers, ie that they 
should not be interpreted as having universal application and apply to the entire internet.
119 In line with the Weltimmo case (n 7).
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ences, behaviours and attitudes.120 Again, this provision is directly con-
nected with social media networks that track individuals and sell their 
personal information for targeted advertising. 
In line with the Directive, where these extraterritorial provisions ap-
ply, the controller or processor must appoint a representative.121 The Reg-
ulation makes it clear that the representative must be established in one 
of the Member States in which the relevant data subjects are based (there 
is no need for a representative in each MS). However, the Regulation does 
not define criteria according to which the relevant MS would be defined 
when relevant data subjects are based in more than one MS nor does it 
detail the representative’s responsibilities.122 There is a limited exemp-
tion to the obligation to appoint a representative where the processing 
is occasional, is unlikely to be a risk to individuals and does not involve 
large-scale processing of sensitive personal data. But again, there is no 
guidance on the scope of occasional processing, and there are no provi-
sions on who bears the burden of proof for occasional processing.123 Still, 
the representative will have to be the subject of enforcement proceedings 
before the relevant supervisory authorities and accept liability for any 
breach of the Regulation.124
There is criticism that the targeting approach applied in article 3(2) 
can be misguided in that it focuses on the subjective intentions of the 
relevant party.125 Although geo-location technologies might be a useful 
tool for clarity in the application of a targeting approach,126 it will prob-
ably provide no certainty for the parties involved in the complex cloud 
environment, where a large number of parties is involved in the handling 
of personal data. Therefore, when considering the judicial jurisdiction of 
the GDPR provision in the cloud environment, courts will probably be in 
a position to conclude either that they target just about every country in 
the world or no countries at all.127
Provisions on extraterritoriality should be interpreted in line with 
the Google Spain decision that introduced a broad concept of establish-
ment.128 Accordingly, a minimal amount of economic activity, such as a 
US-based company using a single sales representative operating in an 
EU country, can be sufficient to trigger the establishment requirement 
120 GDPR (n 14) recital 24. 
121 GDPR (n 14) art 27.
122 See Hon, Hornle and Millard (n 112).
123 ibid 155.
124 GDPR (n 14)  recital 80.
125 DJB Svantesson. ‘Extraterritoriality and Targeting in EU Data Privacy Law: The Weak 
Spot Undermining the Regulation’ (2015) 5(4) International Data Privacy Law 232.
126 ibid. 
127 ibid. 
128 See Google Spain (n 16) and Weltimmo (n 7). 
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and therefore the application of the EU data protection law. However, 
the Google Spain case revealed the practical question of the enforcement 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction: implementing a court decision locally 
might result in undermining the effectiveness of the CJEU ruling, while 
implementing the local requirement on a global scale can bring about 
unintended consequences, eg to constrain the freedom of expression.129 
Therefore, when considering enforcement jurisdiction, the doctrine pro-
poses that national authorities should use a test of proportionality to 
balance the need for effective protection against undue intervention in a 
foreign State’s policies.130
4.2 Cross-border data flows 
Cross-border data flows are one of the biggest data protection is-
sues in cloud computing, due to the fact that personal information pro-
cessed in the cloud usually flows through – and is stored in – various 
jurisdictions across the globe.131 The cloud service provider often does 
not provide information about where the data are stored.132 On the other 
hand, the data protection laws of the country where personal data are 
processed or stored may differ from EU laws or may have an inadequate 
level of protection. This creates a risk that personal data may be without 
restriction and possibly misused, without individuals being able to exer-
cise their data protection rights as they would under EU law. Concretely, 
law enforcement authorities may be able to bypass the individual and ask 
cloud providers who operate in their jurisdiction for access to EU per-
sonal data stored in the cloud. As the transfer of data to third countries 
raises the question of the jurisdiction of data stored by a cloud provider, 
the latter may then face conflicting legal obligations.133 
129 In that regard, see a thorough analysis by B Van Alsenoy and M Koekkoek, ‘Internet 
and Jurisdiction After Google Spain: The Extra-Territorial Reach of the EU’s “Right To Be 
Forgotten”’ (2015) The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No 
152 – March 2015, 15.
130 ibid 29.
131 According to WP29 Opinion (n 39) 7.
132 See European Commission Expert Group on Cloud Computing Contracts Discussion on 
Data Location and Data Security, 10 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/cloud-com-
puting/expert-group/index_en.htm> accessed 1 December 2016.
133 This question was highlighted in 2014 when US federal courts determined that customer 
email data stored in a Microsoft data centre located in Ireland are subject to US law and 
must be turned over to authorities under subpoena. In July 2016, the US Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit reversed a 2014 lower court order, and ruled that Microsoft is not 
required to hand over customer emails held overseas to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
In April 2016 Microsoft sued the United States Department of Justice and asked a court to 
declare the government’s secrecy orders as unconstitutional. The Opinion is available at: 
<http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/14-2985/14-2985-2016-07-14.
pdf?ts=1468508412> accessed 8 January 2017; see a copy of Microsoft’s suit available at 
<http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/microsoftcomplaint.pdf> accessed 
8 January 2017.
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Additionally, the global cloud market today is dominated by US 
companies. Out of the top 25 public cloud companies in Europe, 17 are 
headquartered in the US and they generate 83% of the revenue, 7 are 
headquartered in the EU and generate 14% of the revenue and one is 
in Norway.134 Therefore special concern for cloud providers are rules on 
transatlantic data flows.
Transfer to third states in the GDPR is regulated in a similar way as 
in the Directive, although more comprehensively. Its Chapter V gives de-
tailed rules on this important aspect. In essence, the Regulation imposes 
limits on transfers of personal data outside the EU unless an ‘adequate 
level of protection’ is guaranteed, and the Regulation differentiates sev-
eral different mechanisms for permitting transfer to third countries.
In line with the Directive, the GDPR allows data transfers to countries 
whose legal regime is deemed by the European Commission to provide an 
‘adequate’ level of personal data protection (the so-called adequacy deci-
sion). However, provisions on the adequacy decision are strongly influ-
enced and detailed by the findings of the Court in the Schrems case.135 In 
this regard, recital 104 of the GDPR confirms that a Commission adequa-
cy decision means that the third country or specified entity ensures an 
adequate level of protection ‘essentially equivalent’ to that ensured within 
the European Union. It stipulates that the adoption of an adequacy deci-
sion presumes that the third country ensures effective independent data 
protection supervision and that it has cooperation mechanisms with the 
MSs’ DPAs. Additionally, the data subjects should be provided with ef-
fective and enforceable rights and effective administrative and judicial 
redress. According to the Regulation, the Commission may determine 
that even a specific territory or sector within a third country offers an 
adequate level of protection. The adequacy decisions will be subject to 
periodic review, at least every four years.136 Even more, the Commission 
is obligated to monitor white-listed countries137 ‘on an on-going basis’138 
to see if circumstances arise that would affect its adequacy decisions and 
it has full power to repeal, amend or suspend an adequacy decision at 
any time after giving the affected jurisdiction notice and an opportunity 
to respond.139 
134 EC DG CONNECT, Deloitte study on ‘Measuring the Economic Impact of Cloud Com-
puting in Europe’ SMART 2014/0031, 13 <file:///C:/Users/s50mask/Downloads/Econ-
omicimpactofCloudComputing inEurope.pdf> accessed 20 December 2016.
135 Schrems (n 7).
136 GDPR (n 14) art 45(3).
137 See Commission decisions on the adequacy of the protection of personal data in third 
countries <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/adequa-
cy/index_en.htm> accessed 15 June 2016. 
138 GDPR (n 14) art 45(4).
139 ibid, art 45(5).
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In the Schrems case,140 the Court invalidated the Safe Harbour ad-
equacy decision between the EU and the US, stating that the US does 
not offer an adequate level of data protection which is in place in the EU. 
In particular, the Court found that the access enjoyed by the US intel-
ligence services to the transferred data interferes with the right to respect 
of private life and the right to protection of personal data of EU citizens. 
Following the Schrems ruling and the annulment of the Safe Harbour 
adequacy decision, there was great uncertainty for US businesses on the 
legitimate manner of private data processing, and the European Com-
mission renegotiated a new legal framework with the aim of ensuring 
that personal information of citizens is protected to EU standards when 
it is sent to the US: the EU-US Privacy Shield141 agreement. Considering 
the strict interpretation of privacy rights as a fundamental right in the 
recent CJEU case law,142 there is considerable uncertainty about the fu-
ture of the Privacy Shield. The WP29 has expressed serious reservations 
about the Privacy Shield on the grounds that transfers to the US are still 
subject to ‘mass and indiscriminate surveillance’ by US national secu-
rity agencies, with some DPAs going further and suggesting that other 
transfer mechanisms, such as model contracts, appear to lack adequacy 
for data transfers to the United States, too.143 As stated in the Schrems 
decision, national DPAs are responsible for monitoring compliance with 
the EU data protection law on their respective territories and are vested 
with the power to check whether a transfer of personal data from its own 
territory to a third country complies with EU law. DPAs must therefore 
hear claims made by individuals and, if they consider such claims to be 
well founded, they have the possibility to bring a case before the national 
courts. In light of this, there is a substantial likelihood that the Privacy 
Shield will be challenged in the CJEU and there is considerable risk that 
it could be annulled, which raises the problem of the legal uncertainty of 
transatlantic data flows.144 
140 See Statement of the Art 29 Working Party of 16 October 2015 <http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-release/art29_press_mate-
rial/2015/20151016_wp29_statement_on_schrems_judgement.pdf> and
Position Paper of the German Data Protection Authority of Schleswig-Holstein <www.dat-
enschutzzentrum.de/uploads/internationales/20151014_ULD-PositionPapier-on-CJEU_
EN.pdf>  both accessed on 29 April 2016.
141 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Di-
rective 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (notified under document C(2016) 4176) 
(Text with EEA relevance) [2016] OJ L207/1
142 Eg Digital Rights Ireland (n 15); Google Spain and Google (n 16).
143 Position Paper of the German Data Protection Authority (n 140). 
144 See European Parliament: Transatlantic Digital Economy and Data Protection: ‘State-
of-Play and Future Implications for the EU’s External Policies’ (2016) Policy Department, 
Directorate-General for External Policies, EU, 28 <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/STUD/2016/535006/EXPO_STU(2016)535006_EN.pdf> accessed 29 April 2016.
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In the absence of an adequacy designation, the GDPR provides other 
mechanisms for cross-border data transfers. The controller or proces-
sor might utilise ‘adequate safeguards’ that have been approved by the 
Commission or by the national DPA.145 
Unlike the Directive, the GDPR explicitly recognises binding corpo-
rate rules and standard data protection clauses as adequate safeguards. 
Moreover, it provides clear provisions on requirements and procedures 
for binding corporate rules. If the binding corporate rules meet the re-
quirements set out in the GDPR,146 the competent national DPA must give 
approval. This is likely to make the adoption of binding corporate rules 
easier and should significantly decrease the inconsistencies in its inter-
pretation and implementation from one DPA to another, which is specifi-
cally important with regard to the possible annulment of the US Privacy 
Shield. Moreover, the WP29 acknowledged binding corporate rules as an 
efficient legal instrument for massive transfers made by a processor to 
subprocessors which are part of the same organisation acting on behalf 
and under the instructions of a controller.147 In this regard, binding cor-
porate rules might be applicable in cloud computing.148 
The standard data protection clauses may be adopted by the Com-
mission, or adopted by a supervisory authority and approved by the Com-
mission, and these do not require any further authorisation from a DPA 
as they do under the Directive, which reduces the administrative burden. 
According to WP29, the present model clauses 2010/87/EC149 are appli-
cable in international transfers from an EU controller to a cloud service 
provider established outside the EU.150 However, these model clauses do 
not apply in a situation when the cloud service provider is established in 
the EU. The Regulation has not changed this insufficiency.
145 GDPR (n14) art 46.
146 ibid, art 47.
147 WP29 Explanatory Document on the Processor Binding Corporate Rules adopted on 
19 April 2013 as last revised and adopted on 22 May 2015, 5. See also the WP29 Work-
ing Document 02/2012 setting up a table with the elements and principles to be found in 
Processor Binding Corporate Rules, adopted on 6 June 2012 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp195_
en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2016.
148 See also V Reading, ‘Binding Corporate Rules: Unleashing the Potential of the Digital 
Single Market and Cloud Computing (speech held at IAPP Europe Data Protection Con-
gress, 29 November 2011) 4. 
149 Commission Decision 2010/87/EU (and repealing Decision 2002/16/EC) <http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/transfer/index_en.htm> ac-
cessed 29 April 2016.
150 WP29 Opinion (n 12) 18.
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Finally, the Regulation introduces provisions on codes of conduct151 
and certification152 as adequate safeguards, which provides greater flex-
ibility to data controllers and data processors in selecting the data trans-
fer mechanisms according to their needs. However, these provisions are 
not sufficiently detailed and their application will depend on further in-
terpretation and implementation. 
If there is no adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards, the Regu-
lation defines an enumerated list of derogations permitting limited data 
transfers to non-EU countries.153 The definition of consent was a stum-
bling block in negotiating the Regulation, as consent is seen as some-
times a weak basis for justifying the processing of personal data, and it 
loses its value when it is stretched or curtailed to make it fit situations 
it was never intended for.154 The accepted provision on consent states 
that it should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely 
given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data sub-
ject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, 
such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral 
statement.155 Following this, the Regulation explicitly states that silence, 
pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. 
For sensitive data, explicit consent is needed.156 Given that cloud com-
puting includes a high number of data subjects, that the purpose of pro-
cessing is not always familiar to the cloud provider, and that the location 
from where the data may be processed evolves constantly, it is unlikely 
that consent can be used in cloud computing.157 Further, the WP29158 
states that derogations should only apply to non-massive, non-recurrent 
and non-structural transfers, and therefore it appears almost impossible 
to generally rely on exemptions in the cloud computing environment.159 
The GDPR provides that Member States can invoke important rea-
sons of public interest to expressly set limits to the transfer of certain 
types of data to a third country or international organisation that has not 
received an adequacy decision. Such national provisions must be notified 
151 GDPR (n 14) arts 40 and 41.
152 ibid, art 42.
153 ibid, art 49.
154 WP29 Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent adopted on 13 July 2012   <http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp187_en.pdf>  accessed 29 
April 2016.
155 GDPR (n 14) recital 32. 
156 ibid, art 9.
157 See Expert Group on Cloud Computing Contracts, Discussion Paper on Data Transfer in 
the Cloud, 4  <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/expert_groups/discussion_pa-
per data_transfers_in_ cloud.pdf> accessed 29 April 2016.
158 WP29 Opinion (n 155).
159 WP29 Opinion (n 12) 18.
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to the Commission. This clause runs the risk of producing fragmentation 
among the Member States with regard to their data transfer policies.
Another important provision on trans-border data considers situa-
tions with the legal requirement from a third country.160 In this regard, 
the GDPR states that any judgment of a court or tribunal or decision of 
an administrative authority of a third country requiring a controller or 
processor to transfer or disclose personal data can only be enforced if it 
is based on an international agreement concluded between the EU and 
the requesting third country, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty 
(MLAT). In the absence of such an international agreement, data disclo-
sures are only allowed if the data transfer conditions of the GDPR are 
met. The position under the GDPR on this point is unsurprising in view 
of the discussions within the EU since the Snowden revelations around 
transatlantic data transfers and access to data by government agencies. 
It can be concluded that in line with the present provisions of the 
DPD and the CJEU case law, the provisions of trans-border data flow are 
restrictive and limit data export only to countries having the same data 
protection standard as the EU, thus broadening the application of the 
extraterritorial provisions under the GDPR.161
4.3 Concluding remarks on the extraterritorial application of the 
GDPR 
In conclusion, considering that cloud computing by its nature has 
no boundaries, in order to ensure EU data subjects’ rights, extraterrito-
rial rules seem to be a justifiable regulatory option for the legislator. We 
can therefore conclude that the development of cloud computing is one of 
the reasons why the GDPR considerably expands the scope of the present 
extraterritoriality principle of the Directive, with the clear aim of ensuring 
that the processing of EU citizens’ personal data is always subject to EU 
data protection standards, but even more to ensure a level playing field 
for EU and non-EU service providers.
Considering the international nature of cloud computing, the prin-
ciple of extraterritoriality will have a substantial affect for cloud service 
providers. Taking into consideration that cloud processors are not cur-
rently under direct obligations under the current data protection regime, 
many non-EU companies who have targeted EU consumers but have op-
erated on the basis that EU law does not apply to them, will now have to 
adapt to the strict provisions of the GDPR. There is criticism that given the 
160 GDPR (n 14) art 48.
161 K Hon and C Millard, ‘Data Export in Cloud Computing: How can Personal Data be 
Transferred outside the EEA? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 4’ (2012) 26(2–3) International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology 129, 130. 
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costly administrative measures and obligations for processors, such rules 
should have been envisaged only for businesses that have a substantial 
presence on the European market.162 Additionally, as cloud computing 
activities have effects in, and affect citizens of, multiple States, the ex-
traterritorial principle brings up the issue of the conflict of jurisdictions 
of multiple laws (eg US v EU), which raises the question of enforcement 
jurisdiction.163 Geographic overexpansion may lead to unenforceability, as 
this raises the problem of interference with the territorial sovereignty of 
other states. The Regulation fails to deal with all the mentioned challenges 
already recognised by the doctrine, and further widens its extraterritorial 
application, which will include considerably more cloud service providers 
that will fall within the remit of the new strict provisions of the GDPR. 
However, by introducing the extraterritorial principle, the GDPR im-
poses a higher level of data protection on non-EU service providers, and 
thus in fact introduces measures for the prevention of market disruption. 
Considering that the EU presents a significant market and taking into 
consideration the imposed high fines for non-compliance with the GDPR, 
it can be expected that market subjects will make an effort to comply 
with the EU rules. Therefore, the extraterritorial rules might remove the 
imbalance between EU service providers that are committed to abiding by 
the strict rules of EU data protection and non-EU service providers that 
have a dominant position in the global cloud market. 
5 Conclusion
It is commonly agreed that the current legal framework within the 
DPD does not give adequate data protection to individuals in a society 
ruled by technology and the internet. On the one hand, cloud providers 
say that data protection legislation is outdated and impossible to imple-
ment on technologies that create a new, virtual, globally connected world. 
On the other hand, outdated legislation causes anarchy and leaves indi-
viduals unprotected. Therefore, the GDPR presents an important step in 
the right direction for improved protection for individuals in the frame-
work of personal data protection in the cloud environment. 
After the GDPR enters into force, cloud service providers will be re-
quired to fundamentally change their attitude towards data protection 
162 Svantesson (n 125) 232.
163 For an analysis of the extraterritoriality principle in DPD and GDPR, see M Taylor, ‘Per-
missions and Prohibitions in Data Protection Jurisdiction’ (2016) Brussels Privacy Hub 
Working Paper, vol 6 no 2  <http://www.brusselsprivacyhub.org/Resources/BPH-Work-
ing-Paper-VOL2-N6.pdf>; see, for different views in settling conflicts of law,  C Ryngaert, 
‘Special Issue Extraterritoriality and EU Data Protection  (International Data Privacy Law, 
7 October 2015) <http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/10/07/idpl.ipv025.
full#xref-fn-10-1> both accessed 10 May 2016.
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and to include data protection considerations into the core of their busi-
ness activities. Considering the status of personal data as a human right 
in the EU, and on the other hand given the amount of data in the cloud 
and the lack of control over them by the data subject, this shift of respon-
sibility seems to be justified.
Generally, the Regulation leans heavily on the main concepts of the 
Directive, for example with regard to the definition of personal data, the 
division of roles, the scope of application and the rules on trans-border 
data flows. As noted through the text, these provisions are aligned with 
the findings of the CJEU as well as with the Opinions given by the WP29. 
Despite criticism, the controller–processor roles remain within the 
Regulation, too, although the responsibilities have changed. In particu-
lar, processors can in certain circumstances now be held directly liable 
and be required to pay compensation to a data subject. The Regulation 
fails to exclude commoditised services (IaaS, PaaS) from its application, 
even though they do not have knowledge of the nature of the data stored 
and/or lack the practical ability to access such data. This seems to be 
inconsistent with the aim of the GDPR that attempts to locate the actor 
which truly controls the conditions of processing data. 
The right to erasure will be a challenge for cloud providers to imple-
ment due to the massive transfers of data in the cloud environment and 
the unknown location of data. There will also be challenges in defining 
roles in the context of data protection in cloud computing. The control-
ler has to evaluate whether a request for erasure is legitimate, but faced 
with huge fines, there is a high possibility that such a request for erasure 
will be approved, thus potentially conflicting with the rights to informa-
tion and freedom of speech. The right to erasure imposes enormous re-
sponsibility on cloud service providers, and detailed instructions on its 
application should be prepared by the relevant authority. Provisions on 
data portability might be misused, as big cloud providers might raise the 
transition costs in order to lock in their users. These issues will have to 
be considered by competition rules as well.  
All of these provisions will have direct effect on cloud service provid-
ers. Their roles and obligations will change substantially, as until now 
they have been outside the scope of data protection rules, or at least 
their obligations were marginal. As most of the contractual relationships 
between controller and processor are at present based on standard ‘take 
it or leave it’ terms, the Regulation introduces compulsory provisions on 
future contracts. New obligations on subcontracting will be very hard 
to negotiate for small cloud providers, thus putting the ‘big players’ in a 
much better market position. Some of the new contractual obligations 
present a new administrative burden for cloud providers, and aligning 
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with them will probably lead to higher prices of cloud services. Thus, it is 
to be expected that on the global market EU cloud providers will not be 
competitive with non-EU cloud providers. 
Taking into consideration that cloud processors in general are not 
informed about the data they are storing, and that their service is not di-
rected towards data protection, if encrypted data is exempted from data 
protection rules then cloud providers would be in a good position to be 
exempted from applying data protection rules. Unfortunately for cloud 
computing, the Regulation did not go so far, although the definition of 
pseudonymised data provides greater flexibility in assessing the risk of 
re-indentification, which has been supported by the recent case law. 
In conclusion, it seems that the GDPR itself does not provide meas-
ures to unleash the potential of cloud computing in the EU, but consid-
erably raises standards in line with the position that data protection is 
a fundamental right, thus putting EU cloud service providers in a more 
demanding position than their competition. However, this issue might be 
influenced by the extraterritorial effect of the GDPR. 
In this regard, the scope of the Regulation has been expanded. It now 
applies to companies inside and outside the EU. Even if personal data 
are processed outside the EU by companies established outside the EU, 
as long as they are active in the EU market and offer their products and 
services to EU citizens, these companies will be bound by the EU data 
protection regime. Additionally, the GDPR continues to require that data 
may only be transferred to third countries if the EU legal standards apply 
to their processing, thus widening the extraterritorial application of the 
Regulation.164 Provisions on the scope of the application and trans-border 
transfer of data will create inherent conflicts of jurisdictions, which will 
cause uncertainty for businesses. However, hefty fines, although in cer-
tain circumstances hard to enforce, might force the big non-EU cloud 
providers that dominate the market to raise their standards to comply 
with the GDPR. 
Thus, it might be concluded that with the GDPR the EU is endorsing 
European standards of data security and privacy in a globalised economy 
that will especially influence the cloud computing market. The practical 
consequence of compliance might raise privacy standards both within 
and outside the European Union, thus producing the so-called ‘Brussels 
effect’ in raising privacy protection in cloud computing.165 
164 C Kuner, ‘Extraterritoriality and Regulation of International Data Transfers in EU Data 
Protection Law (2015) 5(4) International Data Privacy Law 241.
165 Or the ‘ratcheting-up’ effect. See M Rotenberg and D Jacobs, ‘Updating the Law of Infor-
mation Privacy: The New Framework of the European Union’ (2013) 36 Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy, 637.
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From the EU Data Protection Regulation to the possible inclusion of 
data protection and electronic commerce in the upcoming US–EU trade 
agreement, as well as with international concerns about US security 
agencies’ collection of personal information worldwide, data protection is 
a rapidly growing field in international law and policy. It seems that the 
Regulation seeks to provide the means for the application of a European 
privacy policy in international markets. However, time will tell how this 
will be enforced.
